Graceful Exit?

This afternoon's briefing by the Secretary of Defense and the Vice Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff offered very little cause for optimism in the lengthening US military deployment to Iraq. Secretary Rumsfeld should remember that petulance, though often employed, has never successfully defended incompetence, or even, as he put it, "honest mistakes." While it is true that imposing an artificial timetable for the withdrawal of troops merely tells insurgents how long they should hunker down before resuming full-scale activities, the US public's opinion of the war, and the clearly related plunge in President Bush's approval ratings, together suggest that a long-term commitment at the present troop level is destined for eventual collapse, most likely from a move by congress to pull the financial rug out from under the operation.

And yet foreign policy should not necessarily be constructed based on opinion polls. The other edge to that sword is that the public overwhelmingly supported the war initially. Oops.

It is now time for the Bush Administration and the Pentagon to perceive and admit the latent reality that they have brought to fruition through the invasion and occupation of Iraq: There are essentially three states contained within the present borders of that nation. Pre-war planning failed to adequately account for this dynamic and the subsequent complexity of the occupation to follow. Similarly, pre-war planning failed to account for the expression of this reality in the construction of the now approved Iraqi constitution - a very loose federal model. Finally, pre-war planning failed to consider the influence of Iran, which has, incidentally, moved sharply to the right with the election of hardliner Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as president.

In considering a drawdown of US troops, one must ask where the problems are concentrated. The answer is fairly simple: Sunni territory. The vast majority of US military operations (and casualties), including the present Operation Steel Curtain, are focused in majority Sunni provinces, especially Anbar Province in the west. Of course, these are also the areas where the federalist constitution was rejected (by well over 2/3 in two provinces, and by about 55% in Nineveh Province).

Taking into account the present federal model, the logical course of action is to accelerate local training and control of security forces in the more stable areas (the predominantly Kurdish north, and the predominantly Shiite south), and re-deploy forces to the restive Sunni areas as local security forces are able to cope with issues in the more stable provinces. Again, while the cautions about timetables remain legitimate, it is not unreasonable to think that perhaps 75,000 US troops could be withdrawn over the next 12 to 18 months.

Of course, the above suggestion is not without problems. Major diplomatic efforts will need to be undertaken with Turkey, which will be made rather nervous by a nascent Kurdish state on its southern border, given its own historic persecution of its Kurdish minority in eastern regions. Similarly, Iran will not be enamored of an empowered Kurdistan on its border, but this will probably be more than balanced by a majority Shiite state on its border in southern Iraq. In truth, the United States needs to be honest about allowing the self-determination of peoples (rather than simply paying lip service to the concept). If Shiites in the south want to form an Islamic state with close ties to Iran, that is their prerogative. The acceptance of this reality may well steal some of Ahmadinejad's anti-American thunder, as it would be increasingly difficult to paint the US as uniformly anti-Shiite or anti-Islamic. It would clearly not precipitate a miraculous resurgence of moderates in Iran, but it would at least bring them back from the fringe to which they have recently been banished.

Turkey and Iran can be mollified, particularly with Turkey seeking membership in the European Community (here's an instance where our European allies can apply some necessary pressure without committing troops to the effort). It is true that allowing a degree of security/military autonomy for Kurdistan and a Shiite state in the south takes Iraq a few steps further down the path of disintegration as a nation, but I would suggest that this process is already underway. It makes sense to attempt to accelerate it under controlled circumstances (i.e., with the Sunnis held in check with the remaining US military assets), rather than to withdraw, either now or years from now, and allow the process to proceed chaotically.

It is further worth considering that the United States is widely seen in the region as disingenuous - advocating democracy, while dreading the actual outcome of elections (e.g., Iran). If we as a nation are serious about allowing other nations and peoples to determine their own destiny, we need to put our money where our collective mouth is - even if we don't particularly like the candidates elected. Indeed, it is the very perception of US meddling in the self-determination of countries that generates the greatest ill will.

One caveat: The United States should never surrender its right to protect its national interests and security. Threats should be engaged and neutralized, employing military force when absolutely necessary. But, as any soldier knows, one should present as small a target profile to the enemy as possible. The present and recent conduct of US foreign policy has, on the contrary, made us both irresistible and convenient as a target in Iraq. Iraq IS the focal point of the so-called "global war on terror," but that is only so because we have made it that way. It is time to lower our profile.

Our profile may only be lowered by reducing military presence in the region, and the best course in the short term is to foster the independence of security forces in the provinces/regions that can most readily sustain them. This will result in independent, security self-sufficient regions, conducting their own business internally and externally. If you listen to the Bush Administration's arguments for democracy and security in the region, you would deduce that this is precisely what was intended. The Sunni territories will continue to be a problem, but that is little different from the present situation. An internationalizing of the troop presence under UN mandate could reduce long-term US presence even in that region.

If the Bush Administration is horrified by the above suggestion of the emergence of three independent states within present Iraqi borders, they should have paid heed to the old adage, "Be careful what you wish for..."

-PMÓS